

LEGITIMATION, COOPTATION, AND REPRESSION AND THE
SURVIVAL OF ELECTORAL AUTOCRACIES

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Appendix

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SLV_94	El Salvador	1994	0.94	0.95	1	0.004	0.73	0.05	0
SLV_94.1	El Salvador	1994	0.94	0.95	1	0.004	0.73	0.05	0
ETH_05	Ethiopia	2005	0.99	1	1	0.004	1.00	1.00	0
GAB_97	Gabon	1997	0.62	1	1	1.00	0.05	0.05	0
GAB_98	Gabon	1998	0.61	1	1	1.00	0.27	0.01	0
GAB_01	Gabon	2001	0.54	1	1	1.00	0.01	0.27	0
GAB_05	Gabon	2005	0.62	1	1	1.00	0.27	0.73	0
GAB_06	Gabon	2006	0.66	1	1	1.00	0.73	0.73	0
GAB_09	Gabon	2009	0.78	1	1	1	0.27	0.95	0
GHA_00	Ghana	2000	0.70	1	1	0.005	0.27	0.27	1
GHA_00.1	Ghana	2000	0.70	1	1	0.005	0.27	0.27	1
GTM_91	Guatemala	1991	0.99	1	1	0.004	1.00	0.73	1
HTI_00	Haiti	2000	0.94	0.05	1	0.004	1.00	0.27	0
HUN_90	Hungary	1990	0.98	0.0001	1.00	0.03	0.01	0.05	1
IDN_99	Indonesia	1999	0.97	0	1	0.02	1.00	1.00	1
IRN_92	Iran	1992	0.99	1	0.54	0.56	1.00	1.00	0
IRN_93	Iran	1993	0.97	1	0.61	0.55	0.99	1.00	0
IRN_96	Iran	1996	0.97	1	0.75	0.54	1.00	1.00	0
IRN_97	Iran	1997	0.97	1	0.65	0.60	1.00	1.00	1
IRN_98	Iran	1998	0.95	1	0.54	0.55	1.00	1.00	1
IRN_00	Iran	2000	0.83	1	0.38	0.52	1.00	1.00	0
IRN_01	Iran	2001	0.79	1	0.23	0.67	1.00	1.00	0
IRN_04	Iran	2004	0.98	1	0.70	0.69	1.00	1.00	1
IRN_08	Iran	2008	0.99	1	0.76	0.96	1.00	1.00	0
IRN_09	Iran	2009	0.99	0.95	0.77	0.98	1.00	1.00	0
CIV_00	Ivory Coast	2000	0.44	1	0.28	0.01	0.99	0.95	1
CIV_01	Ivory Coast	2001	0.48	0	1	0.01	1.00	0.73	0
CIV_00.1	Ivory Coast	2000	0.44	1	0.28	0.01	0.99	0.95	0
KEN_92	Kenya	1992	0.01	0	0.63	0.005	0.99	1.00	0
KEN_94	Kenya	1994	0.001	1	1	0.004	0.73	0.99	0
KEN_97	Kenya	1997	0.22	1	1	0.005	0.95	0.95	0
KEN_02	Kenya	2002	0.50	1	1	0.005	0.99	0.73	1
KEN_92.1	Kenya	1992	0.01	0	0.63	0.005	0.99	1.00	0
KEN_97.1	Kenya	1997	0.22	1	1	0.005	0.95	0.95	0
KEN_02.1	Kenya	2002	0.50	1	1	0.005	0.99	0.73	1
KGZ_05	Kyrgyz Republic	2005	0.97	1	1	0.01	0.73	0.73	0
KGZ_07	Kyrgyz Republic	2007	0.96	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.73	0
KGZ_09	Kyrgyz Republic	2009	0.97	1	1	0.01	0.27	1.00	0
KGZ_05.1	Kyrgyz Republic	2005	0.97	1	1	0.01	0.73	0.73	0
MDG_92	Madagascar	1992	0.79	0	0.69	0.004	1.00	0.27	1
MDG_93	Madagascar	1993	0.86	0.05	0.68	0.004	0.27	0.01	1
MDG_93.1	Madagascar	1993	0.86	0.05	0.68	0.004	0.27	0.01	1
MYS_90	Malaysia	1990	1.00	1	1	0.58	0.27	0.27	0
MYS_95	Malaysia	1995	1.00	1	1	0.56	0.73	0.99	0
MYS_99	Malaysia	1999	0.99	1	1	0.55	0.73	0.95	0
MYS_04	Malaysia	2004	0.99	1	1	0.73	0.73	1.00	0
MYS_08	Malaysia	2008	0.99	1	1	0.96	0.95	0.99	0
MEX_91	Mexico	1991	0.96	1	1	0.16	1.00	0.27	0
MEX_94	Mexico	1994	0.96	1	1	0.06	0.99	0.27	0
MEX_97	Mexico	1997	0.99	1	1	0.19	1.00	0.05	0
MEX_00	Mexico	2000	0.99	1	1	0.11	0.99	0.01	1
MEX_94.1	Mexico	1994	0.96	1	1	0.06	0.99	0.27	0
MEX_00.1	Mexico	2000	0.99	1	1	0.11	0.99	0.01	1
MOZ_09	Mozambique	2009	0.99	1	1	0.04	0.73	0.99	0
MOZ_09.1	Mozambique	2009	0.99	1	1	0.04	0.73	0.99	0
NAM_04	Namibia	2004	0.25	1	1	0.02	0.27	0.05	0
NAM_09	Namibia	2009	1.00	1	1	0.74	0.27	0.95	0
NAM_04.1	Namibia	2004	0.25	1	1	0.02	0.27	0.05	0
NAM_09.1	Namibia	2009	1.00	1	1	0.74	0.27	0.95	0
NPL_91	Nepal	1991	0.97	1	1	0.004	0.99	0.95	0
NIC_90	Nicaragua	1990	0.97	1	1	0.004	1.00	0.99	1
NIC_90.1	Nicaragua	1990	0.97	1	1	0.004	1.00	0.99	1
NER_99	Niger	1999	0.96	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.99	1
NGA_99	Nigeria	1999	0.59	1	0.95	0.04	0.95	1.00	1
PAK_08	Pakistan	2008	0.83	0	1	0.005	1.00	0.99	1
PRY_93	Paraguay	1993	0.89	1	1	0.004	0.05	0.05	0
PRY_93.1	Paraguay	1993	0.89	1	1	0.004	0.05	0.05	0
PER_95	Peru	1995	0.99	1	0.08	0.04	1.00	0.95	0
PER_00	Peru	2000	1.00	0.95	1	0.04	1.00	0.27	0
PER_95.1	Peru	1995	0.99	1	0.08	0.04	1.00	0.95	0
PER_00.1	Peru	2000	1.00	0.95	1	0.04	1.00	0.27	0
RUS_95	Russia	1995	0.48	0.73	1	0.58	1.00	0.27	1
RUS_03	Russia	2003	0.79	0.73	1	0.73	0.95	0.27	0
RUS_04	Russia	2004	0.82	1	1	0.82	1.00	0.95	0
RUS_07	Russia	2007	0.94	1	1	1.00	1.00	0.99	0
RUS_08	Russia	2008	0.95	1	1	1.00	0.99	1.00	0
RWA_03	Rwanda	2003	1.00	1	1	0.004	0.99	1.00	0
RWA_08	Rwanda	2008	1.00	1	1	0.005	0.73	0.99	0
RWA_03.1	Rwanda	2003	1.00	1	1	0.004	0.99	1.00	0
SEN_93	Senegal	1993	0.63	1	1	0.01	1.00	0.05	0
SEN_98	Senegal	1998	0.06	1	1	0.01	1.00	0.05	0
SEN_00	Senegal	2000	0.69	1	1	0.01	1.00	0.73	1
SEN_93.1	Senegal	1993	0.63	1	1	0.01	1.00	0.05	0
SGP_91	Singapore	1991	1.00	1	1	1.00	0.27	0.73	0
SGP_93	Singapore	1993	1.00	1	1	1.00	0.27	0.95	0
SGP_97	Singapore	1997	1.00	1	1	1.00	0.73	0.95	0
SGP_01	Singapore	2001	1.00	1	1	1.00	0.27	0.95	0
SGP_06	Singapore	2006	0.99	1	1	1	0.27	0.99	0
ZAF_94	South Africa	1994	0.59	1	1	0.04	1.00	0.95	1
LKA_94	Sri Lanka	1994	0.97	0.95	1	0.004	1.00	0.27	1
TZA_00	Tanzania	2000	0.93	1	1	0.004	0.95	0.73	0
TZA_05	Tanzania	2005	0.99	1	1	0.004	0.99	0.99	0
TZA_00.1	Tanzania	2000	0.93	1	1	0.004	0.95	0.73	0
TZA_05.1	Tanzania	2005	0.99	1	1	0.004	0.99	0.99	0
THA_92	Thailand	1992	1.00	1	0.01	0.005	0.95	0.73	1
THA_07	Thailand	2007	0.96	1	0.07	0.15	1.00	1.00	1
THA_92.1	Thailand	1992	1.00	1	0.01	0.005	0.95	0.73	1
TGO_98	Togo	1998	1.00	1	1	0.01	0.99	0.73	0
TGO_99	Togo	1999	0.22	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.99	0
TGO_02	Togo	2002	0.24	1	1	0.005	0.73	0.99	0
TGO_03	Togo	2003	0.18	1	1	0.005	0.73	0.99	0
TGO_05	Togo	2005	0.17	1	1	0.005	0.95	0.95	0
TGO_07	Togo	2007	0.20	1	1	0.005	0.99	0.99	0
TUN_99	Tunisia	1999	0.99	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.99	0
TUN_04	Tunisia	2004	0.99	1	1	0.04	0.95	0.99	0
TUN_09	Tunisia	2009	0.99	1	1	0.65	0.99	1.00	0
TUN_99.1	Tunisia	1999	0.99	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.99	0
TUN_09.1	Tunisia	2009	0.99	1	1	0.65	0.99	1.00	0

UGA_96	Uganda	1996	0.98	1	0.19	0.004	0.95	0.95	0
UGA_01	Uganda	2001	0.93	1	0.41	0.004	1.00	0.95	0
UGA_06	Uganda	2006	0.96	1	0.02	0.004	1.00	0.99	0
UGA_06.1	Uganda	2006	0.96	1	0.02	0.004	1.00	0.99	0
VEN_06	Venezuela	2006	0.97	1	1	1.00	1.00	0.95	0
ZMB_06	Zambia	2006	0.97	1	1	0.06	0.95	0.73	0
ZMB_08	Zambia	2008	0.99	1	1	0.59	0.73	0.73	0
ZMB_01	Zambia	2001	0.96	1	1	0.01	0.73	0.95	0
ZMB_06.1	Zambia	2006	0.97	1	1	0.06	0.95	0.73	0
ZWE_95	Zimbabwe	1995	0.92	1	1	0.01	0.27	0.95	0
ZWE_96	Zimbabwe	1996	0.001	1	1	0.01	0.95	0.95	0
ZWE_02	Zimbabwe	2002	0.01	1	1	0.01	0.99	0.99	0
ZWE_05	Zimbabwe	2005	0.75	1	1	0.01	1.00	1.00	0
ZWE_08	Zimbabwe	2008	0.94	1	1	0.02	1.00	1.00	0
ZWE_08.1	Zimbabwe	2008	0.94	1	1	0.02	1.00	1.00	1

2 Raw Data and Calibration Strategy

Figure 1: Histograms of the Distribution of the Raw Data




Figure 2: Histograms of Membership Scores in Condition and Outcome Sets





Figure 3: Plots of Fuzzy Sets Against Base Variables



3 Additional Tables for the Analyses

Table 3: Parameters of Fit, Necessity, Outcome Electoral Defeat

Conditions ^a	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
leg_spec	0.838	0.201	0.237
leg_diff	0.793	0.165	0.088
coop_form	0.776	0.167	0.126
coop_inf	0.101	0.072	0.744
rep_h	0.862	0.200	0.207
rep_s	0.656	0.164	0.264
not leg_spec	0.162	0.157	0.827
not leg_diff	0.207	0.532	0.963
not coop_form	0.224	0.402	0.933
not coop_inf	0.899	0.237	0.327
not rep_h	0.138	0.154	0.850
not rep_s	0.344	0.287	0.824

^a No conjunction passes the consistency threshold of 0.9.

Table 4: Truth Table for the Outcome Electoral Defeat

Row	Leg_spec	Leg_Diff	Coop_form	Coop_inf	Rep_h	Rep_s	Outcome	n	incl	PRI cases
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	0.94	0.94 HUN_90,MDG_93,MDG_93.1
44	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.65	0.65 PAK_08,IDN_99
43	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.52	0.52 MDG_92,HTI_00
52	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	10	0.39	0.39 PER_95,UGA_96,UGA_01,UGA_06, BGD_08,THA_92,THA_07,PER_95.1, UGA_06.1,THA_92.1
20	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.33	0.33 CIV_00,CIV_00.1
56	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.32	0.32 IRN_00,IRN_01
59	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	13	0.27	0.27 MEX_91,MEX_94,MEX_97,MEX_00, SLV_94,PER_00,SEN_93,MEX_94.1, MEX_00.1,SLV_94.1,PER_00.1,SEN_93.1, LKA_94
12	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.25	0.25 CIV_01,KEN_92,KEN_92.1
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.22	0.22 PRY_93,GHA_00,PRY_93.1,GHA_00.1
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.20	0.20 NAM_04,NAM_04.1
60	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	47	0.19	0.19 GTM_91,SLV_91,NIC_90,ARM_07, ARM_08,SEN_00,NER_99,BFA_05, TGO_98,CMR_97,KEN_02,TZA_00, TZA_05,RWA_03,RWA_08,ETH_05, MOZ_09,ZMB_06,ZWE_05,ZWE_08, ZAF_94,TUN_99,TUN_04,EGY_90, EGY_93,EGY_95,EGY_99,EGY_00, EGY_05,EGY_07,KGZ_05,KGZ_07, NPL_91,NIC_90.1,CMR_97.1,NGA_99, KEN_02.1,TZA_00.1,TZA_05.1,RWA_03.1, MOZ_09.1,ZMB_01,ZMB_06.1,ZWE_08.1, TUN_99.1,EGY_05.1,KGZ_05.1
28	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	15	0.18	0.18 TGO_99,TGO_02,TGO_03,TGO_05, TGO_07,CMR_02,CMR_04,CMR_07, CAF_05,KEN_94,KEN_97,ZWE_96, ZWE_02,CAF_05.1,KEN_97.1
63	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.14	0.14 RUS_03,COG_09
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	30	0.09	0.09 VEN_06,RUS_04,RUS_07,RUS_08, AZE_01,AZE_03,AZE_08,GAB_06, ZMB_08,DZA_97,DZA_99,DZA_02, DZA_04,DZA_07,DZA_09,TUN_09, IRN_92,IRN_93,IRN_96,IRN_97, IRN_98,IRN_04,IRN_08,IRN_09, MYS_95,MYS_99,MYS_04,MYS_08, SGP_97,TUN_09.1
58	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.08	0.08 ZWE_95,KGZ_09
61	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4	0.01	0.01 GAB_97,GAB_98,GAB_01,MYS_90
62	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	10	0.01	0.01 GAB_05,GAB_09,NAM_09,BWA_04, BWA_09,SGP_91,SGP_93,SGP_01, SGP_06,NAM_09.1

Table 5: Parsimonious Solution Formula for the Outcome Electoral Defeat

Solution terms ^a	Consistency	PRI ^b	Cov.r ^c
leg_diff*rep_h	0.935	0.935	0.082

^a Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * denotes logical AND.

^b PRI = proportional reduction in inconsistency (Mendel and Ragin 2011, see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 242).

^c Cov.r indicates the raw coverage.

Table 6: Parsimonious Solution Formula, Outcome No Electoral Defeat (Two Models)

Sufficient terms, connected by logical OR ^a	Consistency	PRI ^b	Cov.r ^c	Cov.u ^c	M1	M2
LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*REP_S	0.878	0.878	0.697	0.445	0.661	0.445
COOP_FORM*COOP_INF	0.928	0.928	0.302	0.021		0.050
COOP_INF*rep_s	0.896	0.896	0.066	0.000	0.030	
M1 Overall	0.878	0.878	0.726			
M2 Overall	0.881	0.881	0.747			

^a Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * denotes logical AND.

^b PRI = proportional reduction in inconsistency (Mendel and Ragin 2011, see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 242).

^c Cov.r = the raw coverage; Cov.u = unique coverage.

4 Robustness Tests

Table 7: Alternative Truth Table (n.cut = 1) for the Outcome No Electoral Defeat

Row	Leg_spec	Leg_Diff	Coop_form	Coop_inf	Rep_h	Rep_s	Outcome	n	incl	PRI	cases
62	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	10	0.990	0.990	GAB_05,GAB_09,NAM_09,BWA_04, BWA_09,SGP_91,SGP_93,SGP_01, SGP_06,NAM_09.1
61	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	4	0.986	0.986	GAB_97,GAB_98,GAB_01,MYS_90
58	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	0.920	0.920	ZWE_95,KGZ_09
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	30	0.914	0.914	VEN_06,RUS_04,RUS_07,RUS_08, AZE_01,AZE_03,AZE_08,GAB_06, ZMB_08,DZA_97,DZA_99,DZA_02, DZA_04,DZA_07,DZA_09,TUN_09, IRN_92,IRN_93,IRN_96,IRN_97, IRN_98,IRN_04,IRN_08,IRN_09, MYS_95,MYS_99,MYS_04,MYS_08, SGP_97,TUN_09.1
63	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.864	0.864	RUS_03,COG_09
28	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	15	0.821	0.821	TGO_99,TGO_02,TGO_03,TGO_05, TGO_07,CMR_02,CMR_04,CMR_07, CAF_05,KEN_94,KEN_97,ZWE_96, ZWE_02,CAF_05.1,KEN_97.1
60	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	47	0.814	0.814	GTM_91,SLV_91,NIC_90,ARM_07, ARM_08,SEN_00,NER_99,BFA_05, TGO_98,CMR_97,KEN_02,TZA_00, TZA_05,RWA_03,RWA_08,ETH_05, MOZ_09,ZMB_06,ZWE_05,ZWE_08, ZAF_94,TUN_99,TUN_04,EGY_90, EGY_93,EGY_95,EGY_99,EGY_00, EGY_05,EGY_07,KGZ_05,KGZ_07, NPL_91,NIC_90.1,CMR_97.1,NGA_99, KEN_02.1,TZA_00.1,TZA_05.1,RWA_03.1, MOZ_09.1,ZMB_01,ZMB_06.1,ZWE_08.1, TUN_99.1,EGY_05.1,KGZ_05.1
48	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.810	0.810	AZE_06
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.798	0.798	NAM_04,NAM_04.1
31	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.793	0.793	RUS_95
57	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.783	0.783	PRY_93,GHA_00,PRY_93.1,GHA_00.1
12	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.749	0.749	CIV_01,KEN_92,KEN_92.1
59	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	13	0.732	0.732	MEX_91,MEX_94,MEX_97,MEX_00, SLV_94,PER_00,SEN_93,MEX_94.1, MEX_00.1,SLV_94.1,PER_00.1,SEN_93.1, LKA_94
27	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.706	0.706	SEN_98
56	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.684	0.684	IRN_00,IRN_01
20	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.667	0.667	CIV_00,CIV_00.1
52	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	10	0.609	0.609	PER_95,UGA_96,UGA_01,UGA_06, BGD_08,THA_92,THA_07,PER_95.1, UGA_06.1,THA_92.1
43	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.484	0.484	MDG_92,HTL_00
44	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.354	0.354	PAK_08,IDN_99
41	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.063	0.063	HUN_90,MDG_93,MDG_93.1

Table 8: Alternative Intermediate Solution Formula (consistency threshold = 0.9) for the Outcome No Electoral Defeat

Sufficient terms, connected by logical OR ^a	Consistency	PRI ^b	Cov.r ^c	Cov.u ^c
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*COOP_INF*rep_h	0.991	0.991	0.098	0.014
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*COOP_INF*REP_S	0.930	0.930	0.248	0.164
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*rep_h*REP_S	0.955	0.955	0.124	0.040
Overall solution	0.927	0.927	0.301	

^a Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * denotes logical AND.

^b PRI = proportional reduction in inconsistency (Mendel and Ragin 2011, see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 242).

^c Cov.r indicates the raw coverage.


Table 9: Alternative Intermediate Solution Formula (consistency threshold = 0.74, two models) for the Outcome No Electoral Defeat

Sufficient terms, connected by logical OR ^a	Consistency	PRI ^b	Cov.r ^c	Cov.u ^c	M1	M2
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*COOP_INF	0.925	0.925	0.273	0.011	0.023	0.126
LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*coop_inf*rep_h*rep_s	0.808	0.808	0.054	0.009	0.029	0.009
leg_spec*COOP_FORM*coop_inf*REP_H*REP_S	0.820	0.820	0.145	0.014	0.091	0.014
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*rep_h	0.923	0.923	0.160	0.003		0.012
LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*REP_S	0.871	0.871	0.584	0.051	0.294	
LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*coop_inf*REP_H*REP_S	0.832	0.832	0.448	0.020		0.239
M1 Overall	0.879	0.879	0.728			
M2 Overall	0.864	0.864	0.700			

^a Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * denotes logical AND.

^b PRI = proportional reduction in inconsistency (Mendel and Ragin 2011, see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 242).

^c Cov.r = the raw coverage; Cov.u = unique coverage.

Figure 4: Alternative Calibrations: Plots of Fuzzy Sets Against Base Variables

NOTE: For further robustness tests and alternative calibrations of the other conditions, see R scripts.

5 Theory Evaluation

The theory evaluation refers to Gerschewski's hypothesis of two stable configurations of the pillars: Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes. *Democratization* 20 (1): 13–38.

Table 10: Intersections of Gerschewski's Two Worlds of Autocracies (T) and Empirical Findings (E), Boolean Expressions

Our QCA solution formula identifies:			
	Stable autocracies (E)	Non-stable autocracies (\sim E)	
Gerschewski predicts:	Stable autocracies (T)	<p>LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FROM*REP_S*REP_H + LEG_DIFF*COOP_FROM*COOP_INF*REP_S*REP_H + LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*COOP_INF*REP_S*</p> <p>Y:^b Covered most likely cases [89]^a \simY: Inconsist. most likely cases [13]</p>	<p>!ed_spec*!LEG_DIFF*!COOP_FROM*!COOP_INF*!REP_S*!REP_H + LEG_SPEC*leg_diff*COOP_INF*REP_S + LEG_SPEC*coop_form*COOP_INF*REP_S</p> <p>Y: Uncovered most likely cases [3] \simY: Consist. most likely cases [0]</p>
	Non-stable autocracies (\sim T)	<p>LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FROM*COOP_INF*rep_s + LEG_SPEC*LEG_DIFF*COOP_FORM*coop_inf*REP_S*rep_h</p> <p>Y: Covered least likely cases [8] \simY: Inconsist. least likely cases [0]</p>	<p>leg_spec*leg_diff* + leg_diff*coop_inf + leg_spec*coop_form + coop_form*coop_inf + leg_diff*rep_s + coop_form*rep_s + coop_inf*rep_s + leg_spec*rep_s + leg_spec*rep_h</p> <p>Y: Uncovered least likely cases [26] \simY: Consist. least likely cases [17]</p>

^a Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * denotes logical AND, + logical OR.

^b Y: cases with fuzzy set membership in outcome "No Electoral Defeat" of higher than 0.5, \sim Y: cases with fuzzy set membership in outcome "No Electoral Defeat" of lower than 0.5.

^c The numbers in squared brackets indicate the number of cases being member of each of the four intersections between T and Y and that are members of the outcome Y and \sim Y, respectively.

Further theoretical insights not discussed in the paper refer to cells \sim TE and T \sim E which express where our two autocracy models disagree. As shortly mentioned in the paper, our QCA results identify in the lower-left cell (\sim TE) 8 elections in stable autocracies that Gerschewski does not predict. Because in that cell there is not a single non-stable autocracy, there are good arguments to expand Gerschewski's world in this direction. From Table 11 below, one can also see how well Gerschewski and we perform in the overall attempt at identifying stable autocracies. Notice, for instance, that there are 13 electoral defeats in cell TE (\sim Y) that neither Gerschewski nor we would expect to find there. These puzzling cases lend themselves to closer analysis. Even more puzzling are those 26 cases of stable autocracies (Y) in cell \sim T \sim E. For those, neither Gerschewski nor we would expect the outcome, yet they are stable. These cases should be subjected to within-case analysis with the goal of identifying conditions for stability that are ignored by the WZB model and thus also by our QCA.

Table 11: Intersections of Gerschewski's Two Worlds of Autocracies (T) and Empirical Findings (E), Names of the Cases

Our QCA solution formula identifies:			
	Stable autocracies (E)	Non-stable autocracies (\sim E)	
Gerschewski predicts:	Stable autocracies (T)	<p>Y: SLV_91, VEN_06, RUS_04, RUS_07, RUS_08, ARM_07, ARM_08, AZE_01, AZE_03, AZE_08, BFA_05, TGO_98, TGO_99, TGO_02, TGO_03, TGO_05, TGO_07, CMR_97, CMR_02, CMR_04, CMR_07, GAB_05, GAB_06, GAB_09, CAF_05, KEN_94, KEN_97, TZA_00, TZA_05, RWA_03, RWA_08, ETH_05, MOZ_09, ZMB_06, ZMB_08, ZWE_96, ZWE_02, ZWE_05, ZWE_08, NAM_09, BWA_04, BWA_09, DZA_97, DZA_99, DZA_02, DZA_04, DZA_07, DZA_09, TUN_99, TUN_04, TUN_09, IRN_92, IRN_93, IRN_96, IRN_08, IRN_09, EGY_90, EGY_93, EGY_95, EGY_99, EGY_00, EGY_05, EGY_07, KGZ_05, KGZ_07, NPL_91, MYS_95, MYS_99, MYS_04, MYS_08, SGP_91, SGP_93, SGP_97, SGP_01, SGP_06, CMR_97.1, CAF_05.1, KEN_97.1, TZA_00.1, TZA_05.1, RWA_03.1, MOZ_09.1, ZMB_01, ZMB_06.1, NAM_09.1, TUN_99.1, TUN_09.1, EGY_05.1, KGZ_05.1 \simY: GTM_91, NIC_90, SEN_00, NER_99, KEN_02, ZAF_94, IRN_97, IRN_98, IRN_04, NIC_90.1, NGA_99, KEN_02.1, ZWE_08.1</p>	<p>Y: AZE_06, IRN_00, IRN_01 \simY: [no cases]</p>
	Non-stable autocracies (\sim T)	<p>Y: RUS_03, GAB_97, GAB_98, GAB_01, COG_09, ZWE_95, KGZ_09, MYS_90 \simY: [no cases]</p>	<p>Y: MEX_91, MEX_94, MEX_97, SLV_94, PER_95, PER_00, PRY_93, SEN_93, SEN_98, CIV_01, UGA_96, UGA_01, UGA_06, KEN_92, NAM_04, HTL_00, MEX_94.1, SLV_94.1, PER_95.1, PER_00.1, PRY_93.1, SEN_93.1, CIV_00.1, UGA_06.1, KEN_92.1, NAM_04.1 \simY: MEX_00, HUN_90, RUS_95, CIV_00, GHA_00, MDG_92, MDG_93, PAK_08, BGD_08, THA_92, THA_07, IDN_99, MEX_00.1, GHA_00.1, MDG_93.1, LKA_94, THA_92.1</p>

* Y: cases with fuzzy set membership in outcome No Electoral Defeat of higher than 0.5, \sim Y: cases with fuzzy set membership in outcome "No Electoral Defeat" of lower than 0.5.